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attitude-beliefs. From this, we derive a high-level algorithm that produces appropriate requests for action 
while searching for an explanation. A complete explanation, however, is not the criterion for terminating 
action. Such a criterion, we argue, is better treated in terms of goal-means tradeoffs. TraumAID's 
architecture, in so far as it embodies this goal-directed approach, assigns to a complementary planner the 
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Abstract 
Recent research has abstracted diagnosis away from the activity needed to  acquire 
information and to act on diagnosed disorders. In some problem domains, however, 
such abstraction is counter-productive and does not reflect real-life practice, which 
integrates diagnostic and therapeutic activity. Trauma management is a case in point. 
Here, we discuss a formalization of the integrated approach taken in TraumAID, a 
system we have developed to serve as an artificial aide to residents and physicians 
dealing with multiple trauma. 
Among other things, the active pursuit of information raises the question of what is 
and what is not worth pursuing. In TraumAID 2.0, we take the view that the process 
of diagnosis should continue only as long as it is likely to make a difference to future 
actions. That view is formalized in the goal-directed diagnostic paradigm (GDD). Un- 
like other diagnostic paradigms, goal-directed diagnosis is first and foremost concerned 
with setting goals based on its conclusions. It regards the traditional construction of 
an explanation for the faulty behavior as secondary. 
In order to explicitly represent goal-directedness, the diagnostic process is viewed 
as search in a space of at titude-beliefs. From this, we derive a high-level algorithm that 
produces appropriate requests for action while searching for an explanation. A complete 
explanation, however, is not the criterion for terminating action. Such a criterion, we 
argue, is better treated in terms of god-means tradeoffs. TraumAID's architecture, in 
so far as it embodies this goal-directed approach, assigns to a complementary planner 
the resolution of such tradeoffs. 
1 Introduction 
In many domains, it is common t o  distinguish reasoning and  activity concerned with what 
problems need be  addressed from that concerned with how t o  address those problems. As 
*This work has been supported in part by the Army &search Organization under grant DAAL03-89- 
C0031PRI. 
such, A1 subsumes as separate sub-disciplines, diagnosis research, which concerns itself with 
locating the source (or sources) of a system's faulty behavior, and planning research, which 
is concerned with the construction of appropriate plans for addressing given goals. For the 
most part, research on diagnosis ignores any corrective action that may follow, while planning 
research ignores the reasoning and activity involved in determining its goals and verifying 
their achievement. 
One of the problems with general theories of diagnosis has been that every too often, 
an exponential number of hypothetical failures (diagnoses) can "explain" the faulty be- 
havior [Rymon 911. Thus one faces the problem of which possibility to  attend to first. 
[Poole and Provan 901 were the first to note that the optimality of a diagnosis must depend 
on post-diagnosis goals. To that end, [Provan and Poole 911 advocates the use of utilities in 
order to choose among different potential diagnoses. 
In medicine, it has always been recognized that diagnosis and therapy are strongly tied. 
Thus, medical Artificial Intelligence systems, as early as MYCIN [Shortliffe 741, have always 
considered them together1. Nevertheless, the relationship between diagnosis and therapy 
planning was often left informal and implicit. 
Only recently has work formalizing diagnosis and repair together begun to  appear within 
the diagnosis community. [Rushby and Crow 911 have extended Reiter's consistency-based 
theory of diagnosis to  deal with issues of repair. Within that approach the user can define 
an acceptable mode of operation, and the theory provides for which forms of repair may 
entail a situation that is compatible with such a requirement. [Friedrich et a1 911 presents 
a general theory for diagnosis and repair. Within that theory, the user may again define 
acceptable working conditions for the ailing system. A possible-worlds approach is then 
taken to formally define those steps that can bring the faulty system to such a condition. 
In trauma, as in other domains, management can be roughly decomposed into its diag- 
nostic and therapeutic parts. However, due to the urgent nature of trauma management, it 
is often impossible to defer treatment until after diagnosis is complete. Thus, not only do 
diagnosis and therapy have an impact on each other, they must also be temporally inter- 
leaved. Another important feature of the diagnostic process in trauma management is that 
activity is often necessary in both its diagnostic and therapeutic parts. Such activity is often 
costly and may present direct risk to the patient. 
Goal-Directed diagnosis begins from the point of view that diagnosis is only worthwhile 
only to the extent that it can affect decisions concerning actions. As such it differs from 
other characterizations of diagnosis (e.g. [Reggia et a1 85a, Reiter 87]), that seek complete 
explanations for observed faulty behavior. This view is embodied in TraumAID 2.0 - 
a system designed to serve as an artificial aide to residents and physicians dealing with 
multiple penetrating injuries in a trauma domain [Webber et a1 911. 
TraumAID 2.0 integrates diagnostic reasoning with planning and action. Figure 1 de- 
scribes its basic cycle of reasoning, planning and action. That cycle begins as initial infor- 
'We found the following interesting comment in an article by Rennels and Shortliffe: "Although MYCIN 
is often described as a diagnostic program, its principal motivation was therapy planning". Encyclopedia of 
Artificial Intelligence, p. 589. 
I Reasoner H ~ 1 - 4  Planner I 
Figure 1: Basic Cycle of Reasoning, Planning and Action 
mation (evidence) is provided by the Physician to the Reasoner. From this, the reasoner 
draws some initial conclusions and suggests preliminary goals of action. 
Goals are generally categorized as either therapeutic (i.e. that address already diagnosed 
problems), or diagnostic (i.e. aimed at acquiring information needed to prove or dismiss 
suspected disorders). In that regard, a goal-directed reasoner is first and foremost dedicated 
to recommending appropriate treatment goals. The pursuit of diagnostic goals and the 
explanation of observed faults are strictly secondary, justified only to the extent that they 
may affect therapeutic decisions. 
TraumAID's Planner takes those goals and constructs a recommended plan of action 
to address those goals, which it presents to the physician. Results of actions, as well as any 
new information that becomes available, are reported back to the system to initiate a new 
cycle of reasoning, planning and action. TraumAID's planner is described in more detail in 
[Rymon 91a, Webber et a1 91, Rymon 901. 
An important issue in dynamic diagnostic systems is the timely and orderly acquisition 
of necessary information. The problem of efficiently acquiring new information along the 
diagnosis process has been addressed in medical systems [Horvitz et a1 84, Shwe et a1 891, 
as well as in domain-independent paradigms [de Kleer and Williams 87, Reggia et a1 85b]. 
Most have taken a probabilistic approach that maximizes the utility associated with the 
next piece of information. Here, the selection of an appropriate course of action (therapeutic 
as well as diagnostic) requires resolving goals-means tradeoffs and is therefore cast as a 
typical planning problem. From a system's point of view, such a characterization results in 
modularity. More importantly, it presents us with the opportunity to consider the use of a 
variety of techniques devised for planning problems. 
The primary focus of this paper is on the GDD paradigm - a formalized extension of 
TraumAID's diagnostic reasoning. Section 2 begins by characterizing instances of diagnostic 
problems, continues with the description of a formal language for specifying such instances, 
and concludes by defining the diagnostic explanation problem. Section 4 casts diagnostic 
explanation as a search problem, and derives a meta-algorithm that while searching for an 
explanation, recommends goals (thus solving the diagnostic problem). Finally, section 5 
presents a short example of potential use of the GDD within the TraumAID's architecture. 
2 Problem Formulation 
Following the intuition of [Reiter 871, a diagnostic explanation problem is defined as one of 
finding a belief function that is consistent with one's knowledge of the diagnosed system and 
of the observed (faulty) system behavior. However, for us, this (single) belief constitutes an 
explanation of that behavior even if it is inconclusive with regard to propositions that are not 
determined to be of relevance. Next, a language is defined for specifying diagnostic problems 
in a goal-directed manner, using Prolog-like evidential rules to form conclusions from evi- 
dence and lower-level conclusions, and goal-setting rules to derive diagnostic and therapeutic 
goals from conclusions or from evidence. Evidential rules are also used to conclude whether 
recommended goals have been achieved. 
2.1 Attitude and Belief 
Definition 2.1 Attitude and Belief Functions 
Given a set of propositions HS  
an a t t i t ude  function maps H to the set {R,I) (relevant and irrelevant). 
a belief function maps H to the set {T,F,u) (true, false, or unknown). 
an attitude-belief combines the two and maps H to the set of pairs {R,I) x {T,F,u). 
Conversely, it can also be viewed as a pair ( A ,  B )  of attitude and belief functions. 
We shall say that an attitude-belief function is weakly grounded if its range does not 
include (R,u). We shall say that it is strongly grounded if belief is restricted to {T,F). 
Definition 2.2 Belief Predicates 
Let h be any proposition, (A ,  B )  any attitude-belief function. Let 
t r u e  (h) (or simply h)  Ef (B(h) = T); 
f a l s e ( h )  % (B(h) = F); and 
unknown(h) (B(h) = u). 
W e  also define the following hybrid predicates: 
def 
un less (h )  - f a l s e ( h )  V unknown(h); 
dzf 
compatible-with(h) - t r u e ( h )  V unknown(h) ; and 
known(h) '%! t r u e ( h )  V f a l s e ( h )  . 
The predicates t r u e  and f a l s e  will be called conclusive predicates since our inference 
procedure does not allow negation by failure for antecedents for which we have no confirming 
nor dismissing information. Similarly, we shall say that our belief is conclusive with regard 
to a particular proposition h if known(h) holds. 
Definition 2.3 Attitude Predicates 
Let h be any proposition, (A ,  B )  any attitude-belief function. Let 
re levant  (h) gf ( A  (h) = R); and 
i r r e l evan t  (h) ( A  (h) = I). 
Both relevant and i r re levant  are taken to be conclusive predicates. 
2.2 Representing Knowledge 
Definition 2.4 Rules 
A rule ties a conjunction of predicates over propositions to a conclusion or a goal: 
1. Evidential rules map evidence (and lower-level conclusions) to conclusions: 
Ant l  A Ant2 A . . . A Ant,  + d 
2. Goal Set t ing rules map evidence and conclusions to goals: 
Antl  A Ant2 A . . . A Ant ,  b g 
Terms on the left-hand side of a rule will be called antecedents and are typically comprised 
of a predicated proposition (see example 2.5). The right-hand side of the rule is called the 
header, and is a proposition referring to a conclusion or a goal. 
We shall say that a rule R succeeds if all its antecedents are known to be consistent 
with their respective predicates. R fails only if at least one of its antecedents is known not 
to hold (i.e. failure does not follow from missing information). 
Turning to semantics, a goal-setting rule is used to determine one's attitude toward the 
proposition in its header. If the rule succeeds, the proposition is concluded to be relevant; 
otherwise it is regarded as irrelevant to the problem at hand. Similarly, an evidential rule 
is associated with one's belief in its header proposition. It differs in that for one to believe 
that a proposition is false, all rules for the particular proposition must fail. Barring that, it 
will remain unknown. 
We allow the same proposition to serve as the header of both goal-setting and evidential 
rules. In particular, as header to a goal-setting rule, a diagnostic or therapeutic goal means 
that the rule is used to conclude that the goal is worth adopting. An evidential rule whose 
header is that same goal is used to conclude whether or not it has been satisfied. Similarly, 
a goal-setting rule whose header is a clinical condition is used to conclude that it is relevant 
to investigate that condition. A similarly headed evidential rule is used to conclude whether 
or not the condition holds. For example, the following evidential rule is used to conclude 
that a patient's shock is due to abdominal bleeding. 
Example 2.5 Evidential Rule 
Shock A 
false (Single-Wound-to-Upper-Chest ) A 
unless (Pericardial-Tamponade) A 
unless (Massive-Hemothorax) A 
unless (Tension-Pneumothorax) + Shock-of -Abdominal-Origin 
Next, a goal-setting rule concluding that it is relevant to know whether or not the patient 
has hematuria. 
Example 2.6 Goal-setting Rule 
Wound(Type='Gunshot) A 
Bullet-in-Abdomen b Hematuria 
2.3 A Diagnostic Problem 
Following Reiter, a diagnostic explanation problem is defined whenever one's beliefs, based 
on current observations and a knowledge of the underlying system, are inconsistent. In our 
goal-directed paradigm, on the other hand, a solution to a diagnostic problem is the set of 
recommendations that is based on such an explanation. Inconsistent beliefs in fact will be 
"fixed" when appropriate action is taken. 
Definition 2.7 A Diagnostic Problem Instance 
An instance of a diagnostic problem is a 4-tuple (H, Mo, R B ,  O B S )  such that: 
a H={hl, ha , .  . . , h,) is a set of propositions. For consistency with other definitions of 
diagnostic problems, consider H = DUMUH', where D is a set of disorders, M is a set of 
manifestations and H' is another set of miscellaneous propositions (such as intermediate 
conclusions); 
Mo C M  is a set of observed manifestations (i.e. propositions for which we can, initially, 
assert either true(m) or false(m)); 
a R B  is a set of evidential and goal-setting rules; 
a OBS : Mo -+ {T,F), is a partial belief function. 
Definition 2.8 Consistency 
Given a problem instance P=(H, Mo, RB, O B S ) ,  we shall say that an attitude-belief func- 
tion (A ,  B)  is consistent with P, if the following conditions hold: 
I .  B coincides with OBS on Mo (i.e. V m€Mo B(m)=OBS(m)). 
2. for any hcH-Mo and for any evidential rule R E R B  for which h is a header, whenever 
R succeeds, B ( ~ ) = T .  
3. for any ~ E H - M o ,  if all evidential rules for which h is a header fail, B ( ~ ) = F .  
4. for any ~ E H ,  A ( ~ ) = R  if there is a goal setting rule R in R B ,  such that h is a header 
of R and R succeeds; otherwise A ( ~ ) = I :  
The above definition provides a semantic interpretation for rules. Note that,  under this 
interpretation, hybrid predicates (i.e., ones that can function as either conclusions or goals) 
are just syntactic sugar: any rule that contains such a predicate can easily be transformed 
into two rules that do not. 
Definition 2.9 Candidate Diagnosis 
Given a problem instance P=(H, Mo, RB, OBS),  a belief function A is a candidate 
diagnosis for P if there exists an attitude function A such that (A, A) is consistent w.r.t. 
P. 
We shall say that A is weakly complete if (A, A) is weakly grounded (i.e. no relevant 
propositions are unknown), and strongly complete if it is strongly grounded (i.e. all 
propositions are known). 
Definition 2.10 Refining Beliefs 
Let (Al ,  B1) and (A2, B2) be attitude-belief functions and let h be a proposition. W e  say 
that (A2, B2) is an immediate refinement w.r.t. h of (Al, B1) (denoted ( A 2 ,  B2) Ch (A1, B1)) 
i f l  
1. for all h ' ~  H-{h),  (A2, B2) coincides with (Al, Bl); and 
2. for h, either of the following holds: 
(a) A2 (h)=Al (h), B2(h)c {T,F) and Bl (h)=u; or 
(b) (A2, B2) (h )=(~ ,u )  and (Ai, BI) ( ~ ) = ( R , u ) .  
Figure 2 illustrates this second point schematically, with the direction of immediate refine- 
ment depicted as downward. Informally, a concrete (conclusive) belief is more refined than 
one that is not, and a non-concrete belief is more refined if its inconclusiveness is limited 
to irrelevant proposition. Note that the ~h relation is transitive and anti-symmetric and so 
can be viewed as a partial order. 
Let 1 UhEH Ch then we shall say that (A2, B2) is an immediate refinement of 
(Al, B1) (without referring to  a particular proposition) i f l  (A2, B2) IZ (Al, B1). 
Let C* denote the transitive closure of C. W e  shall say that (A2, B2) is a refinement 
of (4, B1) i 8  (A2, B2) E* (A1 1 B1) - 
Figure 2: Partial Order Induced by the Refinement Relation 
Proposition 2.11 A strongly complete diagnosis cannot be further refined. A weakly com- 
plete diagnosis can only be refined with respect to  irrelevant propositions. 
Definition 2.12 A n  Explanation to  a Diagnostic Problem 
A strong (weak) explanation for a problem instance is a strongly (weakly) complete 
diagnosis. 
By our GDD premise, active diagnostic refinement shall be restricted to those issues that 
can affect future decision. The meta-algorithm presented in section 4.2 thus excludes strong 
explanation as one of its goals. 
3 Goal Inhibition 
Trauma management presents an on-going interplay between diagnosis and therapy. For 
example, it is often necessary to delay or even ignore a diagnostic goal in order to perform 
an immediate therapy. A therapeutic goal may have to give way to other such goal/s that 
have a broader or more important coverage. Logistic considerations may call for delaying 
a therapeutic procedure in order to be able to perform a certain, related or not, diagnostic 
test and so on. 
As previously explained, trauma management considers a test legitimate only if it can 
differentiate diagnoses that require different treatment. However, legitimate tests may also 
have to be deferred until more urgent problems are resolved. 
While issues of goal precedence are addressed by the planner, we do not want the di- 
agnostic reasoner to propose inappropriate goals. A diagnostic goal is inappropriate if, for 
example: 
1. The condition being diagnosed has already been proved or dismissed by other means; 
2. Its treatment, if positively diagnosed, is already covered by that of another, already 
diagnosed, problem; 
3. It is an intermediate diagnosis and all its potential consequences are either proved, 
falsified, or irrelevant; 
4. It cannot be treated for reasons beyond the diagnostic reasoner's control (e.g. due to 
lack of equipment, or skill, or due to conflicts with other therapy).' 
Similarly, a therapeutic goal is inappropriate if it was motivated by a partial diagnosis, and a 
more specific diagnosis was subsequently reached, or if an overriding condition or therapeutic 
goal was detected. 
One way to achieve goal inhibition is to put conditions in relevant goal-setting rules, in the 
form of antecedent clauses that cause them to fail when their goal is deemed inappropriate. 
(This was the case in TraumAID 1.0.) For example, a bullet in the abdomen requires a 
laparotomy. Once the need for a laparotomy is determined though, it is inappropriate to 
investigate other conditions which would also motivate a laparotomy: the surgeon will repair 
all injuries when the laparotomy is performed, not just the one that first motivated it. The 
obvious problem with this solution is that rules become complex and hard to maintain, while 
also losing the separate function that these particular antecedent clauses are meant to serve 
(cf. [Clancey 831 .) 
Our alternative solution to goal inhibition is a general framework for specifying relation- 
ships among goals and between goals and conclusions. It is in the form of two hierarchies 
that can be expanded over a set of GDD rules before they are run, thereby adding relevant 
inhibition clauses automatically. 
In general, there are two classes of goal inhibitions based on goal scaling (or more generally 
goal hierarchy). First, the pursuit of a goal may be terminated when all higher level goals 
for which it serves have already been concluded (either true or false). Secondly, one may 
eliminate a goal if a higher level goal has been concluded as relevant (e.g. all therapeutic 
and diagnostic goals are overridden when a need for emergency thoracotomy is concluded). 
Definition 3.1 Goal Inhibition Hierarchies 
A goal inhibition hierarchy is a partial order on goals. In a conclusion-based inhibition 
hierarchy, if g and h are goals and g<h, then whenever h is concluded (either true or false), 
g becomes irrelevant. In a relevance-based inhibition hierarchy, whenever h becomes relevant, 
g becomes irrelevant. 
As noted before, this goal hierarchy can be specified declaratively and then implemented 
as a macro expansion over the presented specification language. Essentially, for each g ,  h ,  
such that g < h ,  the macro expansion adds to each goal-setting rule headed by g a clause 
stating unknown (h) for relations from the conclusion-based hierarchy, and irrelevant (h) 
for relations from the relevance hierarchy. 
2This latter constraint is not within TraurnAID's purview. While the choice of procedures recommended 
by TraurnAID's planner is sensitive to currently available resources and physician preferences, physicians 
will always be informed if a motivated goal cannot be satisfied by any means currently available. 
4 The Diagnostic Process 
4.1 Diagnosis as Search 
Diagnosis can be viewed as a search through a space of states, each corresponding to a par- 
ticular attitude-belief function, that are linked on the basis of the above refinement relation. 
Explaining a diagnostic problem is equivalent to a search from an identified initial state - 
one that best describes the initial knowledge when diagnosis commences - to a goal state 
- corresponding to an acceptable explanation. Transitions in this space will correspond to 
change in information, or attitude toward particular pieces of information3. 
Definition 4.1 States 
Formally, a state is a pair ( H ,  I'), where H is the set of propositions and I' is an attitude- 
belief function on H. However, since for a particular problem H is fixed, it allows speaking 
of states and attitude-beliefs interchangeably. 
States are accessed where there is a change in attitude or belief. In a diagnostic process, 
a change in an attitude or a belief with regard to a certain proposition will most often be 
the result of the availability of new information. It is thus necessary to show that these arcs 
can reflect any possibly required updates in one's attitude-belief. 
Definition 4.2 Updated Attitude-Belief 
Let I? Ef ( A ,  B)  be an attitude-belief function. We  define F la(h)=,  to be an attitude- 
belief that is the same as I' except that the belief about h is updated to v (where vE {T,F,u)). 
Similarly, we define I' I A ( h ) = v  to be the same as I? except that the attitude toward h is updated 
to v (where VE ( 1 , ~ ) ) .  
In order to define an accessibility function Result, which will account for all possible 
one-proposition attitude-belief updates, Up and Down functions are defined that correspond 
directly to transitions on the refinement hierarchy. 
Definition 4.3 Up and Down operators 
Given an attitude-belief function (A ,  B ) ,  a proposition h, and a new attitude or 
belief (for h)  v, we define: 
r I B ( h ) = U  if B(h) = T  and v = U  
I' I B ( h ) = U  if B(h) = F and v = U 
 UP(^, h, v) = I' I A ( h ) = R  if A(h) = I, B(h) = U and v = R 
undefined otherwise 
31nformation is taken here in a broad sense, ranging from making another observation, concluding the 
presence of a disease, or reporting the performance of a particular action. 
I' I B ( h ) = T  i f  B ( h )  = U and v = T 
I' I B ( h ) = F  if B(h) = U a n d v  = F Downf l ,  h, v) = 
I? ( A ( h ) = I  if A(h) = R,B(h) = U and v = I 
undefined otherwise 
Informally, U p  corresponds t o  a transition t o  a less refined state, while Down corresponds 
t o  a transition t o  a more refined state. 
Definition 4.4 Immediate Accessibility 
Immediate accessibility corresponds to a change in  the attitude or belief with regard 
to a particular proposition h. Let I? 'kf (A,  B) be a state, h a proposition and v the new 
attitude or belief for h. We  define Result@', h, v) as follows (in terms of Up and Down): 
u 
T, F o r I  
R or U 
R 
I o r  U 
F 
U 
I 
R or T 
T 
U 
I 
R o r F  
F 
U 
R 
I o r  T 
T 
Resul tp ,  h, v) 
D o w n p ,  h, v) 
I' (no change) 
Down@', h, v) 
UP@', h, R )  
r (no change) 
D o w ~ ( ~ P ( ~ ,  h, U), h, F) 
UP@', h, U) 
Down(Down(Up(r, h, U), h, I), h, T )  
I' (no change) 
Down(Up(r, h, U), h, T )  
UP@', h, U) 
Down(Down(Up(r, h, U),  h, I), h, F) 
r (no change) 
Down(Up(r, h, U), h, F) 
 UP^, h, U) 
Down(Up(Upfl, h, U), h, R) ,  h, T)  
I? (no change) 
Down(Up(T, h, U), h, T) 
 UP^, h, U) 
Down(Up(UpP', h, U), h, R) ,  h, F) 
r (no change) 
Definition 4.5 Accessibility 
The accessibility function Result* generalizes Result to a sequence of updates. Given 
an initial state I? de' (A,  B )  and a sequence of updates { h i ,  vi)y=,, we define 
def i Resu l t ( r ,  h l ,  v l )  i f n = 1  Result* ( I? ,  { h i ,  vi)rrl)  = Resul t(Resul t*(r ,  ( h i ,  v ; ) ~ ; ~ ) ,  h,  v,) otherwise 
4.2 Diagnosis Interleaved With Planning 
So far, we have on one hand defined a specification language for diagnostic problems and 
on the other hand portrayed diagnosis as a search problem. In this section, we will present 
a meta-level algorithm for diagnosis in an architecture such as TraumAID (see figure 1). 
This algorithm takes a problem instance specified in the above language and solves it while 
searching the refinement-based space. 
Our meta-algorithm (Algorithm 4.6) emulates transitions in the refinement-based search 
space. It begins by setting its initial attitude-belief to coincide with the current set of 
observations. From that point on, transitions will only be made whenever new information 
becomes available, or when conclusions are made or retracted by the inference engine. To 
remain consistent with the search space definitions, all transitions are expressed in terms of 
the accessibility relation Result. 
Algorithm 4.6 A Meta-Level Diagnosis Algorithm 
Program Diagnose (H, Mo, RB ,  OBS). 
{ *  initialization of beliefs and attitudes *} 
For all h~ H, do A ( ~ ) = I ,  B(h)=u. 
For all m€Mo,  do B(m)=OBS(m). 
Until (Plan exhausted) and (No more applicable rules) 
{ *  make all inferences. try to reach consistency. *} 
Until no more applicable rules, do 
Let R be an applicable rule, 
(A ,  B )  t Fire(R, (A ,  B));  
end-until 
{ * follow recommendations *} 
P t Plan ((A, B)); { *  construct a plan to satisfy current goals *) 
Execute (P) until the first piece of information (h,v) comes in; 
( A ,  B)  t Result ((A, B) ,  h, v); 
end-until. 
Inference here takes the form of a closure-like operation in which rules are fired until no 
more of them are applicable. We next define rule applicability and describe the rule firing 
procedure (Fire) in terms of the Result operator. Note that changes in attitude-belief that 
result from rule firings may result in other rules becoming applicable, which will themselves 
subsequently be selected and fired. 
Definition 4.7 Rule Applicability 
Let (A ,  B )  be an attitude-belief and R be a rule, R is applicable if A(header(R))=~,  
B(header(R))=u, and all of R's antecedents can be verified (i.e. all conclusive antecedents 
contain known propositions). 
By its definition, inconsistency is equivalent to the existence of an applicable rule. Ap- 
plicable rules are fired via the following procedure: 
Algorithm 4.8 Resolving Inconsistency via Rule Firing 
Procedure Fire (R ,  (A ,  B)) .  
CZts e 
I .  R is an evidential rule: 
zf R succeeds then 
( A ,  B)  t Result((A, B) ,  header(R) ,~) ;  
else { * Since R is applicable, it must have failed *} 
if all rules for header(R) have failed then 
(A ,  B )  + Result((A, B ) ,  header(R),~);  
2. R is a goal-setting rule: 
if R succeeds then 
(A ,  B) t Result((A, B) ,header(R) ,~) ;  
end-case 
Note that the criterion to terminate diagnosis is the absence of goals, not the completeness 
of the reached diagnosis. Recall that it is the instantiation of appropriate therapeutic goals 
that is important to a goal-directed diagnostician, not necessarily the completeness of the 
by-product explanation. Avoiding a completeness-oriented criterion establishes the claim 
that refinement must be motivated. 
However, also note that any information, whether it has been called for or not, whether it 
is acquired via diagnostic or via therapeutic activity, will be used by the algorithm to refine 
its current diagnosis and possibly trigger new goals. 
4.3 Complexity 
To estimate the overall time required for diagnosis, consider the following factors: 
1. Initialization. Since we have n propositions this would not take more than O(n) .  
2. Rule firing. Assuming monotonic change in information (i.e. that a fact reported as 
true is not retracted later on), each rule cannot be fired more times than the number 
of its antecedents. More often than not, a rule will be fired only once throughout a 
complete session. However, the use of inconclusive antecedents may require re-firing of 
a rule up to  r times, where r is the rule's arity. It is easy to  verify that each call to  the 
Fire routine requires no more than a constant time and so the overall runtime required 
for rule firing is of the order of the size of RB - still linear in the problem size. 
Finally, there is the time taken for planning. As we all know, planning is computa- 
tionally costly. Even very costly. However, that cost is inescapable since TraumAID 
must anyhow plan for therapeutic reasons. [Rymon 901 describes a greedy planning 
paradigm used by TraumAID7s planner. 
Example 
This example is meant to illustrate the diagnostic reasoning process just described and the 
way it complements the activities recommended by a planner such as TraumAID's. It depicts 
diagnosis and treatment of hemothorax problems - internal bleeding in the chest cavity. 
Consider a patient arriving at an emergency room in a stable condition, suffering a gun- 
shot wound to  the left chest. A new diagnostic problem is thus instantiated with the following 
two observations: 
1. OBS(shock)=~,  since the patient is stable; 
2. OBS(Wound(Location='~hest , ~ i d e = ' ~ e f t ) ) = ~  
Let I? dlf (A, B) denote the system's current at titude-belief. Initially A(h)=1, B(h) =u, 
for all propositions ~ E H .  However, as soon as the observations are reported, B changes its 
value for Shock to F, and for Wound(Location= 'Chest, Side= 'Lef t ) )  to T. However, (A, B) 
is now inconsistent due, in part, to the following goal-setting rule: 
Consistency requires firing this rule to set A(~imp1e-~emothorax(Side='Left))=~. 
At this point, if no other issues arise, the system's attitude-belief is consistent. However, 
since it is not refined with respect to  Ch,  for h=Simple-Hemothorax(Side='Left), ( A ,  B)  
is not a complete diagnosis. Hence, the diagnostic goal of proving or dismissing h is set 
and passed along to the planner. A planner such as TraumAID7s current planner would 
recommend a Survey Chest X-Ray as a means of obtaining the desired information. 
Suppose the physician orders an X-Ray, reporting signs of hemothorax and a compound 
fracture to  the left ribs. While the latter information had not been solicited, nevertheless the 
system's attitude-belief toward both propositions will be updated to T. (If X-Ray reports 
are assumed to be complete, beliefs about all other features of the X-ray will be updated to  
F.) While each of those updated beliefs may trigger further investigation, for this example 
we will ignore all but the hemothorax finding. The latter triggers the evidential rule: 
(2) X-Ray-Simple-Hemothorax (Side= 'Left) + Simple-Hemothorax (Side= ) Left) 
Note that the change in belief for Simple-Hemothorax(Side=)Left) from U to T may 
also be interpreted as a success in satisfying the knowledge goal of finding out about it, set 
by rule 1. Note too that we must distinguish a hemothorax finding from the condition of 
having a hemothorax, since the condition can be diagnosed in other ways, such as through 
the presence of decreased breathe sounds. (This latter method would only be used if an 
X-ray machine was not available.) 
(3) Fa1 se (Radiography Available) A 
Decreased-Breath-Sounds(Side='Left) 
+ Simple-Hemothorax(Side='Left) 
The presence of a hemothorax triggers the following goal-setting rule: 
(4) Simple-Hemothorax (Side='Lef t) b Rx-Simple-Hemothorax(Side= ' Left) 
The attitude toward the therapeutic goal Rx-Simple-Hemothorax(Side='Left) is updated 
from I to R and is referred to the planner. A planner such as TraumAID7s would recommend 
addressing it through the insertion of a chest tube. Evidence that a chest tube has been 
inserted leads to a goal becoming relevant of ensuring proper placement of the tube and of 
checking that it is functioning correctly. When both have been verified, the following rule is 
evaluated to check that the treatment goal for the simple hemothorax was actually satisfied: 
( 5 )  False(Chest-Tube-Misplaced(Side='left)) A 
Chest-Tube-is-Functioning(Side= 'left) A 
Chest-Tube-is-Draining-Blood(Side= 'Left) 
+- Rx-Simple-Hemothorax(Side= 'Left) 
In summary, we have tracked the hemothorax from the initial wound report, through 
its suspicion as more investigation is recommended, continuing with the acquisition of more 
evidence that allows for concluding its presence and the need to address it, and finally, 
making sure that the treatment actually works. 
6 Summary 
We assume that diagnosis is only worthwhile to the extent that it can affect decisions and 
so have introduced a goal-directed diagnostic paradigm. In contrast to other diagnostic 
paradigm, goal-directed diagnosis defines a solution to a diagnostic problem as the set of 
reconimendations implied by a diagnosis rather than as the explanation itself. 
We have described a language for specifying diagnostic problems in a goal-directed man- 
ner, and then defined the notion of an explanation (not a solution) to such a problem. We 
have used this definition to derive a meta-algorithm for goal-directed diagnosis. While seem- 
ingly, the algorithm searches for an explanation, its true value lies in the goals it generates 
to facilitate further diagnosis and on-going repair. 
Work in progress: 
1. Implementation - within the TraumAID project, we have completed a revision of our 
existing system [Webber et a1 911. The new system's architecture is identical to the 
one just described. Its diagnostic component is similar, although not identical, to the 
one described. 
In the last step of the revision process, funded by AHCPR, we have just finished 
validating the system against 234 theoretical cases. TraumAID will next be tested 
against a set of 100 actual cases from MCP's trauma center. Another set of 200 cases 
will then be evaluated by a panel of national experts. 
2. Modeling change in beliefs and goals - Temporal projection is the subject of a whole 
research within the TraumAID group. In addition to  that research, within the GDD 
paradigm, it appears worthwhile to  add a time component to beliefs, augmenting the 
inference rules appropriately with mappings from the times in which the antecedents 
hold to the times in which the consequent holds. A mechanism of the type suggested 
by [Console and Torasso 901 seems a natural start point for that process. 
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